

SREB Readiness Courses
Transitioning to college and careers

Literacy Ready

History Unit 3: The Vietnam War
The Academic Notebook

Name



Unit 3

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Course Overview

Welcome! You are enrolled in a second history unit of the SREB Readiness Course-Literacy Ready. What does historical literacy mean? Historical literacy is the ability to read and determine meaning from historical sources whether they are primary, secondary or tertiary sources. In this course, you will take part in several activities to improve your historical literacy. While the content covered in this course is important, a principal purpose is to equip you with the tools necessary to be more successful in college coursework. To that end, the creators of the course have developed this academic notebook.

Purposes of the Academic Notebook

The academic notebook has two roles in this course. The first role of the notebook is to provide you with a personal space to record your work. The academic notebook is where you should record your thoughts about materials you are reading. For example, if you are hearing a lecture, take notes in this notebook. Use the tools in the notebook to assist you in organizing your notes.

The second role of the notebook is that of an assessment tool. Your instructor may periodically collect the notebooks and review your work to insure that you are remaining on task and to assist with any material that is causing difficulty. Your instructor may also assign tasks to be completed in the notebook, such as in-class writing assignments. At the end of this six-week unit, your instructor will review the contents of this notebook as part of your overall grade. Thus, it is important that you work seriously as this notebook becomes the (historical) record of your activity in this course.

Essential Questions

The following essential questions for the entire six-week unit should be used to guide your thinking when analyzing the materials presented in this class. When taking notes, come back to the questions and consider how the historical sources you are analyzing help to answer these questions. The first question is especially important as it represents the theme of the course. In the back of your mind, in every task you complete, you should consider this question. This is partly how historians work, and it is important for you to realize that up front. Historians, like all scientists, approach a problem and try to hypothesize a solution to the problem. Therefore, historians think thematically as they work through source material, which helps account for why two tertiary sources on the same topic may have two different perspectives on the event being studied.

Were the concepts of liberty and equality reflected in US foreign policy?

What conflicts existed in conceptions of liberty and freedom by those participating in The Vietnam Conflict?

Did the concepts of liberty and freedom change over the course of the 1960s as reflected in US foreign policy?

Lesson 1

Overview: US and Vietnam

In this lesson, you will . . .

- Demonstrate an understanding of claim and evidence in history.
- Demonstrate understanding of vocabulary you encountered during reading.

Activity

1 Orientation to the Task

List words, phrases, images, etc. that you associate with the Vietnam War:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Write an explanation of each of these terms based upon what you already know about Vietnam.

Lyndon Johnson

Geneva Accord

Viet Cong

Saigon

Tet Offensive

Gulf of Tonkin

Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Activity

2 Viewing the PowerPoint and Taking Notes

Take notes, paying attention to what you learned about the vocabulary words above, and thinking about the kind of information that is important in history.

Claims & Insights	Notes

Summary:

Activity

3 Thinking about Evidence for Claims

The last slide of the PowerPoint includes some of the interpretations of historians regarding the Vietnam Conflict. These are CLAIMS, which need evidence to back them up. What kind of evidence do you think would be convincing? Next to each claim below, write down what kind of evidence would convince you the claim is true.

Claim	What evidence would be convincing?	Why
LBJ escalated the Vietnam Conflict because he thought his reputation would be hurt if he lost Vietnam to the Communists.		
LBJ felt he had to follow the lead of his advisors about Vietnam, because they were "Harvards."		
Because of the problems in Vietnam, LBJ had no choice but to get more heavily involved.		
LBJ did not want to get involved in Vietnam.		
LBJ and his advisors set up the Gulf of Tonkin incident so they could get more heavily involved.		
LBJ hid from Americans the cost of escalation.		

Graphic Organizer – PowerPoint Overview

Johnson's motivations for involvement and escalation	Johnson's goal	Johnson's tactics
	To win the war in Vietnam	

Also, look for evidence that helps you answer the essential questions:

<i>Were the concepts of liberty and equality reflected in US foreign policy? If so, how? If not, why not?</i>	<i>What conflicts existed in conceptions of liberty and freedom by those participating in the Cuban Missile Crisis? (later: The Vietnam Conflict and the Six-Day War.)</i>	<i>Did the concepts of liberty and freedom change over the course of the 60s as reflected in US foreign policy? If so, how? If not, why not?</i>
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Activity

4 Vocabulary

Revise your definitions based upon information you learned in the PowerPoint.

Lyndon Johnson

Geneva Accords

Viet Cong

Saigon

Tet Offensive

Gulf of Tonkin

Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Activity

5 Orientation to the Task

Did the Johnson administration deliberately incite the Gulf of Tonkin Incident? What really happened on August 4, 1964? Did Johnson knowingly use a questionable report of an attack to push the incident with Congress and escalate the war? After reading the document set in this lesson, write an essay in which you argue an answer to one of the questions. Support your question with evidence from the text.

After deciding answers to these questions, write an argument providing evidence for your answer to one of the questions.

Lesson 2

Types of Texts

In this lesson, you will . . .

- Classify a variety of historical texts and identify challenges to credibility posed by them.
- Learn text-type vocabulary.

Activity

1 Orientation to the Task

List some types of texts you associate with historical study:

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

8. _____

9. _____

10. _____

Activity

2 Classifying and Reasoning about Texts

Using the information you received in class, classify the following examples of texts by noting if they are primary, secondary or tertiary texts and assigning a genre to each one in the space provided. Then, identify the challenges to credibility that might be a characteristic of the genre.

Text	Primary, Secondary or Tertiary? (Circle One)	Genre	Challenges to credibility
Constitution of the United States	Primary Secondary Tertiary		
Goodwin, Doris Kearns, <i>Lyndon Johnson & The American Dream</i> (1991)	Primary Secondary Tertiary		
Article from the <i>New York Times</i> describing US troop deployment (1968)	Primary Secondary Tertiary		
Image of a Vietnamese village on fire after a US attack (1969)	Primary Secondary Tertiary		
Caputo, Philip, <i>A Rumor of War</i> (1977)	Primary Secondary Tertiary		
A cartoon depicting Lyndon Johnson's gradual escalation of US troops in Vietnam (1965)	Primary Secondary Tertiary		
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964)	Primary Secondary Tertiary		
Transcript of questions and answers exchanged between a reporter and a US Army officer (1968)	Primary Secondary Tertiary		
<i>Vietnam: A Television History</i> (1983)	Primary Secondary Tertiary		

Can you tell the structure of a text excerpt? Determine if the following excerpts are *description*, *explanation*, or *argumentation/justification*. Write your answers on the line below each excerpt.

1. The Johnson Administration essentially found itself in a predicament—a “political war trap” that was a product of the nuclear era, the Cold War, and domestic politics in the United States. The “trap” involved a wavering ally whose regime was threatened. The option of not using military force was discounted for fear of a “communist success” if the ally fell and the domestic repercussions this would trigger (Dennis M. Simon, August 2002; retrieved from: <http://www.srvhs.srvusd.k12.ca.us/Staff/teachers/abgardner/Vietnam/The%20Vietnam%20War>).

2. Johnson brought to the White House a marked change of style from Kennedy. A self-made and self-centered man who had worked his way out of a hardscrabble rural Texas environment to become one of Washington’s most powerful figures, Johnson had none of the Kennedy elegance. He was a bundle of conflicting elements: earthy, idealistic, domineering, insecure, gregarious, suspicious, affectionate, manipulative, ruthless, and compassionate. Johnson’s ego was as huge as his ambition (Tindall and Shi, page 1318).

3. In the end, the United States failed either to avert a communist takeover of South Vietnam, or to avoid humiliation, loss of prestige, and domestic recrimination. To be sure, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and southern National Liberation Front (NLF) did not directly evict US forces from Vietnam, nor even inflict upon them a major set-piece battlefield defeat like the Viet Minh did on the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954... But if US forces were not defeated, neither did they inflict a strategically decisive defeat on the communist side (6)... Years of bombing North Vietnam and “attriting” communist forces in South Vietnam neither broke Hanoi’s will nor crippled its capacity to fight. The absence of US military defeat did not guarantee political success. The appearance of Saigon as Ho Chi Minh City for the past 20 years on maps of Southeast Asia is testimony to the defeat of the American cause in Vietnam (Record, Jeffries, [Winter, 1996-96], Vietnam in retrospect: Could we have won? Parameters, 51-65).

4. On several occasions before March 9, the Vietminh League urged the French to ally themselves with it against the Japanese. Instead of agreeing to this proposal, the French colonialists so intensified their terrorist activities against the Vietminh members that before fleeing they massacred a great number of our political prisoners detained at Yen Bay and Cao Bang (taken from The Declaration of Independence, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, written by Ho Chi Minh in 1945).

Circle any words or phrases that helped you decide what type of text each excerpt was. Discuss your choices.

Lesson 3

Timeline of Vietnam

In this lesson, you will . . .

- Infer historical trends and relationships regarding the Vietnam Conflict using a timeline.
- Ask questions about the Vietnam Conflict after studying the timeline.
- Determine vocabulary meanings by using available resources.

Activity

1 Orientation to the Task

What can you infer about these events, put in chronological order?

- A student gets caught smoking in the bathroom.
- His parents ground him for one week.

What about these events?

- There is potato salad at a picnic.
- A number of people get sick to their stomachs immediately after eating picnic food.

In timelines, events are in chronological order, but historians infer the relationships among the events, based upon the best evidence. Events are not necessarily in causal relationships if they are listed chronologically.

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal green ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins or other markings on the paper.

Activity

2 Making Inferences from a Timeline

Study the following timeline and come up with: (a) three inferences, and (b) three questions. Specify what kind of evidence you would need to be surer of your inference and what kind of evidence you would need to answer your questions. A map is provided so that you can locate the sites that are referenced in the timeline.



Timeline of American Involvement in Vietnam

1945

Ho Chi Minh Creates Provisional Government.

Following the surrender of Japan to Allied forces, Ho Chi Minh and his People's Congress create the National Liberation Committee of Vietnam to form a provisional government. Japan transfers all power to Ho's Vietminh.

Ho Declares Independence of Vietnam.

British Forces Land in Saigon, Return Authority to French.

1946

Indochina War begins.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam launches its first concerted attack against the French.

1950

Chinese, Soviets Offer Weapons to Vietminh.

US Pledges \$15M to aid French.

The United States sends \$15 million dollars in military aid to the French for the war in Indochina. Included in the aid package are military advisors.

1954

Battle of Dienbienphu begins.

A force of 40,000 heavily armed Vietminh lay siege to the French garrison at Dienbienphu. Using Chinese artillery to shell the airstrip, the Vietminh make it impossible for French supplies to arrive by air. It soon becomes clear that the French have met their match.

Eisenhower cites "Domino Theory" regarding Southeast Asia.

Responding to the defeat of the French by the Vietminh at Dienbienphu, President Eisenhower outlines the Domino Theory: "You have a row of dominoes set up. You knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly."

Geneva Agreements announced.

Vietminh and French generals sign the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. As part of the agreement, a provisional demarcation line is drawn at the 17th parallel, which will divide Vietnam until nationwide elections are held in 1956. The United States does not accept the agreement, and neither does the government.

1955

Prime Minister of Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem holds fraudulent referendum. Diem becomes President of Republic of Vietnam.

1956

French Leave Vietnam.

US Training South Vietnamese.

The US Military Assistance Advisor Group (M.A.A.G.) assumes responsibility from the French for training South Vietnamese forces.

1957

Communist Insurgency in South Vietnam.

Communist insurgent activity in South Vietnam begins. Communist Guerrillas assassinate more than 400 South Vietnamese officials. Thirty-seven armed companies are organized along the Mekong Delta.

1959

Weapons Moving Along Ho Chi Minh Trail.

North Vietnam begin infiltrating cadres and weapons into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Trail will become a strategic target for future military attacks.

1961

Vice President Johnson Tours Saigon.

During a tour of Asian countries, Vice President Lyndon Johnson visits Diem in Saigon. Johnson assures Diem that he is crucial to US objectives in Vietnam and calls him “the Churchill of Asia.”

1963

Buddhists Protest Against Diem.

Tensions between Buddhists and the Diem government are further strained as Diem, a Catholic, removes Buddhists from several key government positions and replaces them with Catholics. Buddhist monks protest Diem’s intolerance for other religions and the measures he takes to silence them. In a show of protest, Buddhist monks start setting themselves on fire in public places.

Diem Overthrown, Murdered.

With the tacit approval of the United States, operatives within the South Vietnamese military overthrow Diem. He and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu are shot and killed.

1964

Gulf of Tonkin Incident.

On August 2, three North Vietnamese PT boats allegedly fire torpedoes at the U.S.S. Maddox, a destroyer located in the international waters of the Tonkin Gulf, some thirty miles off the coast of North Vietnam. The attack comes after six months of covert US and South Vietnamese naval operations. A second, even more highly disputed attack, is alleged to have taken place on August 4.

Debate on Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is approved by Congress on August 7 and authorizes President Lyndon Johnson to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” The resolution passes unanimously in the House, and by a margin of 82-2 in the Senate. The Resolution allows Johnson to wage all out war against North Vietnam without ever securing a formal Declaration of War from Congress.

1966

LBJ Meets With South Vietnamese Leaders.

President Lyndon Johnson meets with South Vietnamese premier Nguyen Cao Ky and his military advisors in Honolulu. Johnson promises to continue to help South Vietnam fend off aggression from the North, but adds that the US will be monitoring South Vietnam's efforts to expand democracy and improve economic conditions for its citizens.

1967

Martin Luther King, Jr. Speaks Out Against War.

Calling the US "the greatest purveyor of violence in the world," Martin Luther King publicly speaks out against US policy in Vietnam. King later encourages draft evasion and suggests a merger between antiwar and civil rights groups.

1968

North Vietnamese Launch Tet Offensive.

In a show of military might that catches the US military off guard, North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces sweep down upon several key cities and provinces in South Vietnam, including its capital, Saigon. Within days, American forces turn back the onslaught and recapture most areas. From a military point of view, Tet is a huge defeat for the Communists, but turns out to be a political and psychological victory. The US military's assessment of the war is questioned and the "end of the tunnel" seems very far off.

My Lai Massacre:

On March 16, the angry and frustrated men of Charlie Company, 11th Brigade, America Division enter the village of My Lai. "This is what you've been waiting for -- search and destroy -- and you've got it," say their superior officers. A short time later the killing begins. When news of the atrocities surfaces, it will send shockwaves through the US political establishment, the military's chain of command, and an already divided American public.

Paris Peace talks begin.

Following a lengthy period of debate and discussion, North Vietnamese and American negotiators agree on a location and start date of peace talks. Talks are slated to begin in Paris on May 10 with W. Averell Harriman representing the United States, and former Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy heading the North Vietnamese delegation.

1969

Ho Chi Minh Dies at age 79.

News of My Lai Massacre Reaches US

Through the reporting of journalist Seymour Hersh, Americans read for the first time of the atrocities committed by Lt. William Calley and his troops in the village of My Lai. At the time the reports are made public, the Army has already charged Calley with the crime of murder.

1971

Pentagon Papers published.

The New York Times publishes the Pentagon Papers, revealing a legacy of deception concerning US policy in Vietnam on the part of the military and the executive branch. The Nixon administration, eager to stop leaks of what it considers sensitive information, appeals to the Supreme Court to halt the publication. The Court decides in favor of the Times and the First Amendment right to free speech.

1973

Cease-fire Signed in Paris.

A cease-fire agreement that, in the words of Richard Nixon, “brings peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia,” is signed in Paris by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. The agreement is to go into effect on January 28.

End of Military Draft Announced.

Last American Troops Leave Vietnam.

Adapted from: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/timeline/tl3.html#a>.

Inference	What evidence would you need to give you confidence in this inference?
1.	
2.	
3.	

Question	What evidence would you need to answer this question?
1.	
2.	
3.	

Think about these inferences and questions as you read the chapter in the next lesson.

Lesson 4

Reading and Annotating History Texts

In this lesson, you will . . .

- Show through your annotations that you are identifying historically important information about Vietnam from reading.
- Show through discussion and graphic organizers that you can think critically about the information in the chapter.
- Show through annotations and discussion your understanding or discipline-specific and general academic vocabulary.
- Show your understanding of chronology and significance by adding to the Vietnam Timeline.
- Collect textual evidence that addresses the essential questions.

Activity

1 Orientation to the Task

Preview Chapter 30 of *The Americans*. What features does this chapter provide?

Given your preview and what you know about the textbook authors, how trustworthy is the information in this text?

Activity

2 Analyzing History Textbook Chapters

Review G-SPRITE: Geographical, Social, Religious, Intellectual, Technological, and Economic. Review Annotation Guidelines.

Annotate....

- Relationships among events—chronology, causation.
- Actors—who (individuals or groups) is engaging in actions aimed at meeting goals.
- Actions—what the actors (are) doing, the tactics or methods they are using.
- Characteristics—of actions, actors, policies, movements, events.
- Motivations—the goals that lead the actors towards action.
- Categorizations of actions into political, social, economic, religious, cultural, etc.
- Comparison and Contrast—of interpretations of cause/effect, motivations, characteristics, etc.
- Vocabulary—use of words that signal intentions of the author or bias, words that describe key concepts, and words that signal relationships among events.

Read to verify your inferences and answer your questions. Read to find evidence to answer the essential questions.

The essential questions are:

<i>Were the concepts of liberty and equality reflected in US foreign policy? If so, how? If not, why not?</i>	<i>What conflicts existed in conceptions of liberty and freedom by those participating in The Vietnam Conflict?</i>	<i>Did the concepts of liberty and freedom change over the course of the 1960s as reflected in US foreign policy? If so, how? If not, why not?</i>
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Activity

3 Annotating the Text

Annotate the text. After you are finished, evaluate your annotations using the form below.

Annotation Evaluation for History

Check all the features of annotation that you used:

- ☐ 1. Information about the source
- ☐ 2. Information that signaled
 - ☐ a. Cause/effect
 - ☐ b. Comparison contrast
 - ☐ d. Chronology (words signaling time)
 - ☐ c. Bias or judgment
 - ☐ e. Discipline-specific information and vocabulary
 - ☐ f. Other
- ☐ 3. Unknown general academic vocabulary
- ☐ 4. Key actors, actions, goals, and tactics, etc.
- ☐ 5. Political, social, economic, legal, or other characterizations of information
- ☐ 6. Marginal notations that show
 - ☐ a. summarizing
 - ☐ b. inferencing
 - ☐ c. reacting
 - ☐ d. connecting to other information
 - ☐ e graphic or pictorial representations of information (e.g., cause-effect chains, time lines)

Evaluate your annotations

- | | | |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. My annotations helped me to focus on the information. | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| 2. My annotations would help me review the chapter for a test. | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| 3. My annotations helped me understand the information better. | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| 4. My annotations helped me to think critically. | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |

What did you do well?

What could you improve?

Complete G-SPRITE using the chart below on this and every section in this chapter as you read. What factors were important in each of the phases of the Vietnam Conflict? Write the information and page number in the spaces to help you analyze the reasons for why the Vietnam War proceeded the way it did.

	Moving Toward Conflict	US Involvement and Escalation	A Nation Divided	1968: A Tumultuous Year
Geographical				
Social				
Political				
Religious				
Intellectual				
Technological				
Economic				

Activity

4 Debriefing

Section One: Moving Toward Conflict

Discuss what you paid attention to with your class in this section.

Think about the questions that are raised in this discussion, including the following:

Danzer (textbook): “On November 1, 1963, a US-supported military coup toppled Diem’s regime. Against Kennedy’s wishes, Diem was executed.”

Timeline: “With the tacit approval of the United States, operatives within the South Vietnamese military overthrow Diem. He and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu are shot and killed.”

How do these statements differ? How would you determine the most supported interpretation?

Read the document on the next page and decide which interpretation it supports. Write your thoughts here:

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 25, 1963

Check-List of Possible U.S. actions
in Case of Coup

1. Evacuation of American dependents.
2. Movement of U.S. forces into positions outside Viet-Nam from which they can be readily dispatched to Viet-Nam, if the occasion arises, for:
 - a. Protecting Americans in Viet-Nam.
 - b. Removal of U.S. equipment from Viet-Nam.
 - c. Intervention into political struggle.
 - d. Stabilization of military situation vis-a-vis the Viet-Cong.
3. Inducement (financial, political or otherwise) to opportunists or recalcitrants to join in coup.
4. Cessation of all U.S. aid to Diem Government and announcement thereof.
5. Use U.S. facilities in Viet-Nam (military advisors, transport, communications, etc.) in support of coup group.
6. Political actions to point coup toward civilian government.
 - a. Discussions with military officers.
 - b. Protection of potential civilian heads of state and discussions with them.
7. Once coup group has seized power, rally promptly to its support with statements and assistance.

FE:JAMendenhall:aws

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)
Department of State Guidelines
By mmk NARA, Date 3/21/97

The question left unanswered by the text above is whether President Kennedy supported Diem's assassination. Read the following account offered by historian Richard Reeves in his book, *President Nixon: Alone in the White House*, page 371. (Retrieved from http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=vietnam_637&scale=2#vietnam_637.)

President Nixon's aides have diligently tried to find evidence linking former President John F. Kennedy to the 1963 assassinations of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu (see June 17, 1971), but have been unsuccessful. "Plumber" E. Howard Hunt (see July 7, 1971) has collected 240 diplomatic cables between Washington, DC, and Saigon from the time period surrounding the assassinations, none of which hint at any US involvement in them. White House aide Charles Colson, therefore, decides to fabricate his own evidence. Using a razor blade, glue, and a photocopier, Colson creates a fake "cable" dated October 29, 1963, sent to the US embassy in Saigon from the Kennedy White House. It reads in part, "At highest level meeting today, decision reluctantly made that neither you nor Harkin [apparently a reference to General Paul Harkins, the commander of US forces in Vietnam at the time] should intervene on behalf of Diem or Nhu in event they seek asylum." [REEVES, 2001, PP. 371]

What implications for interpreters of history are there for fabricated or made-up evidence?

Do you know yet whether or not the President approved or did not approve the assassination of Diem? If not, what kind of evidence would you look for?

Section Two: US Involvement and Escalation

Read and annotate the next section. Add to G-SPRITE when you are finished. Discuss your thoughts in class. Join the discussion. How do these statements differ? How would you determine the most supported interpretation?

Section Three: A Nation Divided

Read and annotate this next section. Add to G-SPRITE when you are finished. Discuss your thoughts in class. Join the discussion.

Think about the effects of the Vietnam Conflict. List these, then make a concept map that illustrates their relationship.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Etc.

Concept Map:

Section Four: 1968: A Tumultuous Year

Read and annotate the next section. Add to G-SPRITE when you finished. Discuss your thoughts in class. Join the discussion.

Three questions to ponder:

- Do you think that President Johnson should have stayed in the race for the Presidency? Why or Why not? What evidence are you basing your answer on?
- Read Danzer's description of the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention again. Do you think Danzer agrees with the way the Chicago police handled the protesters? What in the text makes you answer that way? Based upon your reading, what is your opinion? Do you believe that the Chicago police overstepped their bounds, or were they justified? What in the text makes you answer that way?
- When Nixon became president, he said he wanted, "peace with honor." What did that mean to him? Did he achieve his goal? Why or why not?

Consider using a T-Chart, writing down evidence for both "Yes" and "No" to each question, then deciding.

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Activity

5 Vocabulary

With what words are you still struggling? Write these below. In class discussions, determine their meanings.

Discipline-specific vocabulary: Talk through the following discipline-specific terms. What can you say about them now that you have read the chapter?

Organizations

- Vietminh/National Liberation Front
- Vietcong
- ARVN
- Green Berets
- SDS
- FSM

Documents

- Geneva Accords
- Tonkin Gulf Resolution

Events

- Tet Offensive
- Cold War

Other Terms

- Communism
- fragging
- Domino Theory
- USS Maddox
- USS Turner Joy
- War of Attrition
- Napalm
- Agent Orange
- search and destroy mission
- Doves and Hawks

People

- Ho Chi Minh
- Ngo Dinh Diem
- Barry Goldwater
- Robert McNamara
- Walter Cronkite
- Dean Rusk
- General William Westmoreland
- Senator William J. Fulbright
- Robert Kennedy
- Eugene McCarthy
- Hubert Humphrey
- Richard Nixon
- George Wallace

Places

- French Indochina
- Ho Chi Minh Trail
- Cambodia
- Gulf of Tonkin
- Laos
- Dien Bien Phu

Policies

- containment
- escalation

Activity

6 Returning to the Timeline

Go back to the timeline that you studied in Lesson 10.

Is there anything you read in the text that is not mentioned here? If there is, is it significant enough to add? Is there anything already on the timeline that you would like to change, remove, or add? Write these in their appropriate year.

1945 _____

1946 _____

1950 _____

1954 _____

1955 _____

1956 _____

1957 _____

1959 _____

1961 _____

1963 _____

1964 _____

1966 _____

1967 _____

1968 _____

1969 _____

1971 _____

1973 _____

Activity

7 Returning to the Essential Questions

What did you learn that addresses the essential questions?

Were the concepts of liberty and equality reflected in US foreign policy? If so, how? If not, why not?

What conflicts existed in conceptions of liberty and freedom by those participating in the Vietnam Conflict?

Did the concepts of liberty and freedom change over the course of the 1960s as reflected in US foreign policy? If so, how? If not, why not?

Lesson 5

Answering Document-Based Questions

In this lesson, you will . . .

- Demonstrate your ability to interpret primary source documents.
- Show your understanding of the Vietnam Conflict through your answers to a document-based question.
- Demonstrate your ability to write an essay answering the document-based question.

Activity

1 Orientation to the Task

How did Ho Chi Minh’s motivations change from 1945 to 1962? After reading the documents in this lesson, write an essay in which you compare the language among the three documents (spanning the years from 1945 to 1962) and argue what these changes say about Ho Chi Minh’s motivations.

Discuss this prompt with a partner in class. What do you need to interpret for? What will you be looking for as you read the documents?

Example:

Texts	Document A	Document B	Document C
Who is the intended audience?	(Include paraphrases or quotes.)		
What is the tone? What language signals the tone?	(Include language that signals tone.)		
What was happening at the time the document was written?			
What is the purpose of the document?	Include paraphrases or quotes.)		
How does the language change from the first to the second document? The second to the third?			
What does the language reveal about motivation and how does it change over time?			
How does this support your explanations of motives?			

Claim or Thesis: What changes in language were there? What do these changes reveal about Ho Chi Minh’s motives and how they changed over time?

Activity

2 Reading the Documents

Document A

“Declaration of Independence, Democratic Republic of Vietnam”*

Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi, 2 September 1945).

“All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”

This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free.

The Declaration of the French Revolution made in 1791 on the Rights of Man and the Citizen also states:

“All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights.” Those are undeniable truths. Nevertheless, for more than eighty years, the French imperialists, abusing the standard of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland and oppressed our fellow-citizens. They have acted contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice. In the field of politics, they have deprived our people of every democratic liberty.

They have enforced inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political regimes in the North, the Center and the South of Vietnam in order to wreck our national unity and prevent our people from being united. They have built more prisons than schools. They have mercilessly slain our patriots—they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood. They have fettered public opinion; they have practiced obscurantism against our people.

To weaken our race they have forced us to use opium and alcohol. In the fields of economics, they have fleeced us to the backbone, impoverished our people, and devastated our land. They have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw materials. They have monopolized the issuing of banknotes and the export trade. They have invented numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people, especially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty. They have hampered the prospering of our national bourgeoisie; they have mercilessly exploited our workers.

In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese Fascists violated Indochina’s territory to establish new bases in their fight against the Allies, the French imperialists went down on their bended knees and handed over our country to them. Thus, from that date, our people were subjected to the double yoke of the French and the Japanese.

Their sufferings and miseries increased. The result was that from the end of last year to the beginning of this year, from Quang Tri province to the North of Vietnam, more than two million of our fellow-citizens died from starvation. On March 9, the French troops were disarmed by the Japanese. The French colonialists either fled or surrendered,

showing that not only were they incapable of “protecting” us, but that, in the span of five years, they had twice sold our country to the Japanese.

On several occasions before March 9, the Vietminh League urged the French to ally themselves with it against the Japanese. Instead of agreeing to this proposal, the French colonialists so intensified their terrorist activities against the Vietminh members that before fleeing they massacred a great number of our political prisoners detained at Yen Bay and Cao Bang.

Notwithstanding all this, our fellow-citizens have always manifested toward the French a tolerant and humane attitude. Even after the Japanese putsch of March 1945, the Vietminh League helped many Frenchmen to cross the frontier, rescued some of them from Japanese jails, and protected French lives and property.

From the autumn of 1940, our country had in fact ceased to be a French colony and had become a Japanese possession. After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French.

The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains, which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the Fatherland. Our people at the same time have overthrown the monarchic regime that has reigned supreme for dozens of centuries. In its place has been established the present Democratic Republic.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government, representing the whole Vietnamese people, declare that from now on we break off all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all the international obligation that France has so far subscribed to on behalf of Vietnam and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our Fatherland.

The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common purpose, are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists to reconquer their country. We are convinced that the Allied nations, which at Tehran and San Francisco have acknowledged the principles of self-determination and equality of nations will not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Vietnam.

A people who have courageously opposed French domination for more than eighty years, a people who have fought side by side with the Allies against the Fascists during these last years, such a people must be free and independent.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, solemnly declare to the world that Vietnam has the right to be a free and independent country and in fact it is so already. The entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilize all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty.

Source: Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works (Hanoi, 1960-1962), Vol. 3, pp. 17-21.

* Note, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been renamed The Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Document B**The Manifesto of The Laodong Party, February 1951**

(The Vietnam Dang Lao Dong Party [Vietnam Workers' Party] controlled the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). It was established in February 1951. Ho Chi Minh chaired the Central Executive Committee of the Lao Dong Party from its creation until his death in September 1969.)

The main task of the Viet Nam Laodong Party now is: To unite and lead the working class, the working masses and the entire people of Viet Nam in their struggle to wipe out the French colonialists and defeat the American interventionists; to bring the liberation war of the Viet Nam people to complete victory, thereby making Viet Nam a genuinely independent and united country.

The Viet Nam Laodong Party fully supports the Government of the Viet Nam Democratic Republic, unites and co-operates closely with other parties and organizations in the Lien Viet Front in order to realize fully the people's democratic regime-politically, economically, socially and culturally.

The Viet Nam Laodong Party stands for guaranteeing the legitimate interests of all strata of the people.

It recommends that special care should be taken to raise the material and moral standards of living of the army, which fights for the defense of the country against the enemy, and which had been enduring the greatest hardships.

The workers, who are fighters in production, must have the opportunity continually to improve their living conditions and to take part in running their own enterprises.

The peasants, who are production combatants in the rural areas, must benefit from the reduction of land rent and interest and from appropriate agrarian reforms.

The intellectual workers must be encouraged and assisted in developing their abilities.

Small trades-people and small employers must be assisted in developing trade and handicrafts.

The national bourgeoisie must be encouraged, helped and guided in their undertakings to contribute to the development of the national economy.

The right of the patriotic landlords to collect land rent in accordance with the law must be guaranteed.

The national minorities must be given every assistance and must enjoy absolute equality in rights and duties.

Effective help must be rendered to the women so as to bring about equality between men and women.

Believers in all religions must enjoy freedom of worship.

Overseas Vietnamese in foreign countries must be protected.

The lives and properties of foreign residents in Viet Nam must be protected.

Chinese nationals, in particular, if they so desire, will be allowed to enjoy the same rights and perform the same duties as Vietnamese citizens.

In the field of external affairs, the Viet Nam Laodong Party recommends: 'The Viet Nam people must unite closely with and help the peoples of Cambodia and Laos in their struggle for independence and, with them, liberate jointly the whole of Indo-China; actively support the national liberation movements of oppressed peoples; unite closely with the Soviet Union, China and other people's democracies; form close alliances with the peoples of France and the French colonies so as to contribute to the anti-imperialist struggle to defend world peace and democracy!

Confident in the efforts of all its members, in the support of working men and women and in the sympathy of the entire people, the Viet Nam Laodong is sure to fulfill its tasks of: Bringing the liberation war to complete victory. Developing the people's democratic regime. Contributing to the defence of world peace and democracy. Leading the Viet Nam people toward Socialism.

Source:

New China News Agency, April 6, 1951.

Document C

Viet Cong Program, 1962
PROGRAM OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF
VIETNAM January 1962

1. We will overthrow the Ngo Dinh Diem government and form a national democratic coalition government.
2. We will carry out a program involving extension of democratic liberties, general amnesty for political detainees, abolition of agrovilles and resettlement centers, abolition of the special military tribunal law and other undemocratic laws.
3. We will abolish the economic monopoly of the US and its henchmen, protect domestically made products, promote development of the economy, and allow forced evacuees from North Vietnam to return to their place of birth.
4. We will reduce land rent and prepare for land reform.
5. We will eliminate US cultural enslavement and depravity and build a nationalistic progressive culture and education.
6. We will abolish the system of American military advisers and close all foreign military bases in Vietnam.
7. We will establish equality between men and women and among different nationalities and recognize the autonomous rights of the national minorities in the country.
8. We will pursue a foreign policy of peace and will establish diplomatic relations with all countries that respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam.
9. We will re-establish normal relations between North and South as a first step toward peaceful reunification of the country.
10. We will oppose aggressive wars and actively defend world peace.

Source:

Reprinted from *Viet Cong* by Douglas Pike (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1966).

Copied from: <http://www.unc.edu/courses/2009fall/hist/140/006/Documents/VietnameseDocs.pdf>.

Activity

3 Reviewing sample DBQ Essays

Study the examples of document-based essays. Decide what you think makes a good essay. Then, review the rubric for a DBQ essay and evaluate the essay using the rubric.

Directions: The following question requires you to construct a coherent essay that integrates your interpretation of Documents A-G and your knowledge of the period referred to in the question. High scores will be earned only by essays that both cite key pieces of evidence from the documents and draw on outside knowledge of the period.

How and for what reasons did United States foreign policy change between 1920 and 1941?

Use the documents and your knowledge of the period 1920-1941 to construct your response.

Document A

Source: Candidate Warren G. Harding in a speech at Des Moines, Iowa, October 1920.

I oppose the League not because I fail to understand what . . . ‘we are being let in for,’ but because I believe I understand precisely what we are being let in for.

I do not want to clarify these obligations; I want to turn my back on them. It is not interpretation but rejection that I am seeking. My position is that the present League strikes a deadly blow at our constitutional integrity and surrenders to a dangerous extent our independence of action.

Document B

Source: Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., November 12, 1921.

The world looks to this Conference to relieve humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in armament, and it is the view of the American Government that we should meet that expectation without any unnecessary delay. It is therefore proposed that the Conference should proceed at once to consider the question of the limitation of armament. . . .

Document C

Source: Edwin L. James, European correspondent of *The New York Times*, October 1930.

Officially, our government stays out of world organizations . . . we continue to shy at the World Court. But such things count for less and less. We must deal with the world and the world must deal with us. Let there be an international conference, and imponderable influences bring the United States there. A conference on reparations, we are there. The International Bank is set up, an American is made president. The World Court meets, an American is put on the bench . . . It is always the case that the American position is among the most important. Such is one of the prices of our power. Few world problems arise in which the influence of the United States will not swing the decision if we take a real interest. Opposition to the United States is a serious undertaking. Our dollars are powerful; there are so many of them.

Document D

Source: “Butchery Marked Capture of Nanking.” *The New York Times*, December 18, 1937.

Through wholesale atrocities and vandalism at Nanking the Japanese Army has thrown away a rare

opportunity to gain the respect and confidence of the Chinese inhabitants and of foreign opinion there . . . Wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder of civilians, the eviction of Chinese from their homes, mass executions of war prisoners and the impressing of able-bodied men [have] turned Nanking into a city of terror. The killing of civilians [has been] widespread. Foreigners who traveled widely through the city Wednesday found dead on every street. Some of the victims were aged men, women, and children . . . Many victims were bayoneted and some of the wounds were barbarously cruel. Any person who ran because of fear or excitement was likely to be killed on the spot as was anyone caught by roving patrols in streets or alleys after dusk.

Document E

Source: Republican Party platform, June 1940.

The Republican Party is firmly opposed to involving this nation in a foreign war. We are still suffering from the ill effects of the last World War . . .

The Republican Party stands for Americanism, preparedness and peace. We accordingly fasten upon the New Deal full responsibility for our unpreparedness and for the consequent danger of involvement in war.

We declare for the prompt, orderly, and realistic building of our national defense to the point at which we shall be able not only to defend the United States, its possessions, and essential outposts from foreign attack, but also efficiently to uphold in war the Monroe Doctrine.

Document F

Source: Full-page advertisement in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, September 1940.

Mr. Roosevelt today committed an act of war. He also became America's first dictator. Secretly his Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, entered into an agreement with the British Ambassador that amounts to a military and naval alliance with Great Britain . . .

The President has passed down an edict that compares with the edicts forced down the throats of Germans, Italians and Russians by Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. He hands down an edict that may eventually result in the shedding of the blood of millions of Americans; that may result in transforming the United States into a goose-stepping regimented slave-state . . . Of all the sucker real estate deals in history, this is the worst, and the President of the United States is the sucker.

Essay 1:

Between the two world wars, United States foreign policy changed from being isolationistic to having increasing fears of what global events might do to the free world if they did not do something to help out in World War II. Until the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, the United States remained reluctant to have any active role in the war for fear of another aftermath like that of World War I in which Europe had massive debt to the United States which it could not pay back and an American society that turned isolationistic and cynical, with writers of the Lost Generation like F. Scott Fitzgerald, and the Roaring Twenties characterized by mass consumerism and materialism. Americans just wanted to keep to themselves until sometime after the Great Depression of the early 1930s, where a war-stimulated economy may have become a more appealing idea.

President Woodrow Wilson's plan of the League of Nations after World War I presented a conflicting issue within the United States, over the US participation in it. Warren Harding's view in Document A clearly reflects the isolationistic view that most Americans held. It was a conflict between the irreconcilables and the reservationists. Wilson was stubborn in his determination to get the US to participate in the League of Nations (the irreconcilable side) while others, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, opposed Article X of the charter, which stated that the US would have to join in a war if its alliances did so. The election of Harding in 1920 represented the popular opinion of rejection of the League of Nations and participation in this world court that would put limitations on the US. The 1920's would show a trend of Republican, laissez-faire presidents like Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, who would only focus on domestic policy (limited as it was) and keep totally out of world issues. Document B, however, shows the concern of some over the armaments build up within Europe. Although the treaty of Versailles would limit German militarism, the years leading up to WWII with the rise of Hitler would overturn this. Nonetheless, Americans remained reserved throughout the Twenties.

After the stock market crash in October 1929, the spark of the Great Depression, the 1930s would show increasing awareness of global issues and perhaps a need to get involved. In Document C, when James refers to "a conference on reparations," he is talking about the Young Plan and Dawes Act in which the United States agreed to alleviate the debt of Germany from WWI and extend the payment time. This is reflective of some opinions that perhaps the United States does have a role to play in a world court, being a superpower. However, James says "Our dollars our powerful" and that the US is economically stable, even though this was stated in October 1930, a year into the Great Depression, and this questions the validity of this person's opinion of US readiness for global participation. With the Japanese invading Manchuria and the "Rape of Nanjing" being publicized in the *New York Times*, this reflects increased public sentiment toward what is happening outside of the US. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal program is allowing the economy to slowly get back on its feet with increased social legislation and government regulation of business. By the time this article appeared in 1937, the public's eyes were opened to the horrors occurring in China as so descriptively revealed in Document C.

Document E, showing the platforms of the Republican and Democratic parties for the election of 1940, reveals the platforms are incredibly similar. Both reflect the resolution to keep out of World War II, started in 1939. Both are determined to uphold the Monroe Doctrine of isolationism. The Republican Party criticizes the New Deal but, like the Democrats, advocated preparedness and military buildup. The comment of the need for a strong navy by the Democrats reflects the opinions of Alfred Mahan, who expressed that the country who rules the seas rules the world. Document F criticizes FDR's principle of aiding Great Britain in the war. The public was concerned with this because of the Nye committee report which stated that the reason America was dragged into World War I was because of the bankers who had economic ties with Europe by lending them money. However, FDR is aware of this and established the cash and carry rule, in violation of the Neutrality Acts, and states that Britain may receive supplies from the US only if they pay cash and carry the supplies in their own ships, in order to prevent the debt problem of WWI. The cartoon of Document G reflects the growing question of the US role in the war and the confusion and differences of opinion. Some people question the "wiseness" in appeasing Hitler while many are determined to remain isolated. However, it is clear that since these are becoming major issues and questions, the US is no longer totally to themselves. The statement FDR makes in Document H and his analogy to the fire hose reflects the need he sees to keep Great Britain alive by helping it defend himself. If Britain falls, there is threat of the rest of the free world falling to communism or fascism. William H. Taft, now the Supreme Court Chief Justice, referred to FDR's statement as the "chewing gum theory"—once you lend a country war supplies, you do not want it back. This portrays the other opinion of keeping totally out of the war.

Until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the US would continue to lend supplies to the allies but do everything else to not fight. Nonetheless, this shows a change from the general feeling of the 1970s of complete isolationism to the growing concern of the fate of the free world during WWII.

Essay 2:

After 1920, the world was recovering from the horror of WWI. Many Americans were upset with the loss of life that had occurred; which led to a policy of isolationism. With the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe and the start of WWII American grudgingly began to change. There were many reasons for this change, from isolationist to world player both at home and abroad.

The end of WWI left Americans shocked and horrified at the deaths that had occurred. Congress did not support the Versailles Treaty, and politicians spoke out against it, specifically the League of Nations (Document A). People felt that the league would encroach upon American policies, and Americans didn't like the idea of Europeans having a say in their affairs.

In the Roaring Twenties the economy boomed and to continue economic success protective tariffs were raised. Military spending was down and there was an effort to disarm (Document B). This idea that the weapons would no longer be needed was founded in the idea that the first world war had been so bad that there would never be another. This and what led to the policy of appeasement.

After Black Tuesday in 1929, the economies of all the nations in the world were doing badly. The London Conference was called and Hoover promised to go. It was important that America attend because many of the war debts were owed to her, and one of the main goals was to stabilize currency. America's dollar was relatively strong, but in the end, Hoover elected not to attend the conference. His no show rendered the conference useless (Document C) and continued America's policy of isolationism.

On September 18, 1931, Japan attacked Manchuria. America condemned the action but did nothing. It was not until many years later that public opinion (shown by Document D) had shifted enough to support embargoes against Japan. Still no military action was taken but the US could no longer ignore world affairs.

After the outbreak of WWII, specifically the defeat of France and the Battle of Batan the US began taking a more active role in world affairs. Still neutral American continued to maintain that it would not enter the war (Document E). This was very important to FDR because he was re-elected on the campaign slogan "he kept us out of the war." However tariffs had been lowered during the "New Deal" and trade with foreign powers commenced on the basis that they pay cash and take bought good away themselves.

As Americans began siding more and more with the Allies isolationism broke down, (Document H) FDR developed a policy of "lending" munitions and supplies to England, France and eventually Russia. Many Americans doubted this (Document F).

In the 20 years between 1920 and 1940 America went from completely isolated to taking an active (but neutral) part in world affairs. In 1941 the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor and war was declared. By this point the army and navy had been built up (Document E) and America was ready for war.

What makes a DBQ good?

Evaluate the two essays using the DBQ rubric on the next two pages.

Notes:

AP US HISTORY: GENERIC RUBRIC FOR DBQ RESPONSES

The list of characteristics following the grades apply to both free response essays and DBQs and indicate what student essays need to contain in order to score in a particular category. In addition, DBQ essays must incorporate document analysis and substantial information that is not contained in the documents (outside information).

8-9 points

- Strong, well-developed thesis which clearly addresses the question; deals with the most significant issues and trends relevant to the question and the time period.
- Abundant, accurate specifics; may contain insignificant errors.
- Depending on what is called for, demonstrates well-reasoned analysis of relationship of events and people, cause and effect, continuity and change.
- Covers all areas of the prompt in approximate proportion to their importance (extremely good papers need not be totally balanced).
- Effective organization and clear language.

DBQ: Sophisticated use of a substantial number of documents; substantial relevant outside information; chronologically coherent.

5-7 points

- Has a valid thesis; deals with relatively significant issues and trends.
- Some accurate specific information relevant to the thesis and question
- Analyzes information: uses data to support opinions and conclusions; recognizes historical causation, change and continuity.
- Adequately addresses all areas of prompt; may lack balance.
- May contain a few errors, usually not major.
- Adequately organizes; generally clear language; may contain some minor grammatical errors.

DBQ: Use of some documents and some relevant outside information.

2-4 points

- Thesis may be absent, limited, confused, or poorly developed; may take a very general approach to the topic, failing to focus on the question; position may be vague or unclear.
- Superficial or descriptive data which is limited in depth and/or quantity.
- Limited understanding of the question; may be largely descriptive and narrative.
- Adequately covers most areas of the prompt; may ignore some tasks.
- May contain major errors.
- Demonstrates weak organization and writing skills, which may interfere with comprehension.

DBQ: Misinterprets, briefly cites, or simply quotes documents; little outside information, or information which is inaccurate or irrelevant.

0-1 point

- Usually has no discernible thesis, contains a thesis that does not address the question, or simply restates the question.
- Superficial, inappropriate or erroneous information; or information limited to a small portion of the prompt.
- Analysis may be fallacious.
- May contain numerous errors, both major and minor.
- May cover only portions of the prompt; refers to the topic but does not address the prompt.
- Erratic organization; grammatical errors may frequently hinder comprehension.

DBQ: Poor, confused or no use of documents; inappropriate or no outside information.

Conversion to numerical grades:

9	98
8	93
7	88
6	83
5	78
4	74
3	68
2	63
1	58

Essay 1: Score

Reason for score:

Essay 2: Score

Reason for score:

Activity

4 Writing the Essay

Outline the rest of your essay.

Write a first draft.

A large, empty rectangular box with a thin green border, occupying the majority of the page. It is intended for students to write their answers to document-based questions.

Using the rubric above, evaluate your essay, and have another student evaluate it as well. After evaluating, rewrite your essay to improve it. Read it to another student or group and ask for feedback. Get feedback from your teacher. Then, revise it one more time in the space below.

A large, empty rectangular box with a thin green border, occupying the majority of the page. It is intended for students to write their answers to document-based questions.

Lesson 6

Interpreting History and Writing an Argument

In this lesson, you will . . .

- Demonstrate your ability to interpret primary and secondary source documents.
- Show your understanding of the issues in the Gulf of Tonkin Incident through graphic organizers and discussion.
- Demonstrate your ability to write a historical argument that takes a stand on a historical controversy and provides evidence to support the stand.

Activity

1 Orientation to the Task

After reading the documents in this lesson, decide the answer to three questions:

1. Did the Johnson administration deliberately incite the Gulf of Tonkin Incident?
2. What really happened on August 4, 1964?
3. Did Johnson knowingly use a questionable report of an attack to push the incident with Congress and escalate the war?

After deciding answers to these questions, write an argument providing evidence for your answer to one of the questions.

Activity

1 Reading the Documents

In this lesson, you will be reading a number of interpretations of an event about which historians still have different opinions you will determine the credibility and perspective of the authors of these documents. You will determine their positions regarding the three questions. After reading and annotating, both of you are to fill in information for a “Yes” and a “No” answer, judge the weight of evidence and come to consensus about your views. Then, another pair will join you. Once again, you will come to consensus.

Credibility Analysis

The Tonkin Gulf Crisis,” by Gareth Porter

Speaker (what do you know about the author and publisher?)	Occasion (When was this written and what was happening at the time?)	Audience (Who is the expected reader of this document?)	Purpose (What is the purpose for this text? What are the author(s) trying to do?)	Tone (What words are used that help you determine the authors’ purpose?)	Credible? (Is the perspective in this document something that you can trust? Why or Why not?)

“Fact or Fiction,” by Douglas Pike

Speaker (what do you know about the author and publisher?)	Occasion (When was this written and what was happening at the time?)	Audience (Who is the expected reader of this document?)	Purpose (What is the purpose for this text? What are the author(s) trying to do?)	Tone (What words are used that help you determine the authors' purpose?)	Credible? (Is the perspective in this document something that you can trust? Why or Why not?)

“Secrets of the Vietnam War,” by Philip Davidson

Speaker (what do you know about the author and publisher?)	Occasion (When was this written and what was happening at the time?)	Audience (Who is the expected reader of this document?)	Purpose (What is the purpose for this text? What are the author(s) trying to do?)	Tone (What words are used that help you determine the authors’ purpose?)	Credible? (Is the perspective in this document something that you can trust? Why or Why not?)

“As I Saw It,” by Dean Rusk

Speaker (what do you know about the author and publisher?)	Occasion (When was this written and what was happening at the time?)	Audience (Who is the expected reader of this document?)	Purpose (What is the purpose for this text? What are the author(s) trying to do?)	Tone (What words are used that help you determine the authors' purpose?)	Credible? (Is the perspective in this document something that you can trust? Why or Why not?)

“The Fog of War,” video excerpt

Speaker (what do you know about the author and publisher?)	Occasion (When was this written and what was happening at the time?)	Audience (Who is the expected reader of this document?)	Purpose (What is the purpose for this text? What are the author(s) trying to do?)	Tone (What words are used that help you determine the authors’ purpose?)	Credible? (Is the perspective in this document something that you can trust? Why or Why not?)

Wayne Morse Says No

Speaker (what do you know about the author and publisher?)	Occasion (When was this written and what was happening at the time?)	Audience (Who is the expected reader of this document?)	Purpose (What is the purpose for this text? What are the author(s) trying to do?)	Tone (What words are used that help you determine the authors' purpose?)	Credible? (Is the perspective in this document something that you can trust? Why or Why not?)

President Johnson's Midnight Address to the American people (YouTube)

Speaker (what do you know about the author and publisher?)	Occasion (When was this written and what was happening at the time?)	Audience (Who is the expected reader of this document?)	Purpose (What is the purpose for this text? What are the author(s) trying to do?)	Tone (What words are used that help you determine the authors' purpose?)	Credible? (Is the perspective in this document something that you can trust? Why or Why not?)

Robert McNamara Phone Call

Speaker (what do you know about the author and publisher?)	Occasion (When was this written and what was happening at the time?)	Audience (Who is the expected reader of this document?)	Purpose (What is the purpose for this text? What are the author(s) trying to do?)	Tone (What words are used that help you determine the authors' purpose?)	Credible? (Is the perspective in this document something that you can trust? Why or Why not?)

Did the Johnson Administration deliberately incite the Gulf of Tonkin Incident?		
YES	OUR VIEW	NO
Gareth Porter		Gareth Porter
Douglas Pike		Douglas Pike
Philip Davidson		Philip Davidson
Dean Rusk		Dean Rusk
Textbook excerpt		Textbook excerpt
Fog of War		Fog of War
Wayne Morse Says No		Wayne Morse Says No
Johnson's Midnight Address		Johnson's Midnight Address
Robert McNamara Phone Call		Robert McNamara Phone Call

What really happened on August 4, 1964?		
YES	OUR VIEW	NO
Gareth Porter		Gareth Porter
Douglas Pike		Douglas Pike
Philip Davidson		Philip Davidson
Dean Rusk		Dean Rusk
Textbook excerpt		Textbook excerpt
Fog of War		Fog of War
Wayne Morse Says No		Wayne Morse Says No
Johnson's Midnight Address		Johnson's Midnight Address
Robert McNamara Phone Call		Robert McNamara Phone Call

Did Johnson knowingly use a questionable report of an attack to push the incident with Congress in order to escalate the war?		
YES	OUR VIEW	NO
Gareth Porter		Gareth Porter
Douglas Pike		Douglas Pike
Philip Davidson		Philip Davidson
Dean Rusk		Dean Rusk
Textbook excerpt		Textbook excerpt
Fog of War		Fog of War
Wayne Morse Says No		Wayne Morse Says No
Johnson's Midnight Address		Johnson's Midnight Address
Robert McNamara Phone Call		Robert McNamara Phone Call

The Tonkin Gulf Crisis

Gareth Porter

Source: Gareth Porter is a historian who wrote an editorial on the OpEd page in The New York Times on the 20th anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf Incident—August 9, 1984. He is considered a Vietnam expert, and has published a two-volume set of annotated documents from the conflict.

The 20th anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution this week is an occasion for a reassessment. For years it has been debated whether or not the Johnson administration deliberately misled Congress and the public about a second attack on United States destroyers in the Gulf. But the information now available suggests that it was a classic case of self-deception and blundering deeper into conflict.

The accumulated evidence makes it reasonably certain that the alleged North Vietnamese PT boat attack of Aug 4 was a figment of the US government's imagination. CIT Deputy Director Ray Cline evaluated the reports and intelligence data on the incident some days later and found the case for an attack unconvincing.

But leading national security officials were so geared up for military confrontation with Hanoi that they refused to consider evidence that it was not happening. They believed that Hanoi had attacked the Maddox on Aug 2 because it saw a connection between the US ship and South Vietnamese islands commando raids on North Vietnamese islands on July 31. They expected the same thing to happen after another commando raid on the coast Aug 3-4. And they knew that this time, the President wanted to retaliate against the North.

Word reached the Pentagon on the morning of Aug 4 that an intercepted North Vietnamese message indicated a "naval action" was imminent. Although the message did not say that it would take the form of an attack, it triggered a process of preparing for retaliatory action that had an irreversible momentum. Before the first reports from the Maddox that the attack was under way, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and other Pentagon officials immediately met to discuss various options for retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam.

Even after the commander of the two destroyers warned that earlier reports of torpedo attacks were in doubt and recommended no further action be taken until after a "complete evaluation," the preparations for air attacks continued. Mr. McNamara spent a little more than one hour with the Joint Chiefs of Staff considering whether an attack had taken place before releasing the strike order—without benefit of any complete evaluation of the incident. It took President Lyndon Johnson only 18 minutes of discussion with his advisers to approve the strike. When the planes took off to bomb North Vietnamese targets that night, detailed reports from the two destroyers had not even reached Washington.

More serious than this rampant subjectivity and excessive haste in considering the evidence and using force was the administration's ignorance of the effect the bombings would have on Hanoi policy. US officials believed that graduated military pressure on

the North, combined with other evidence of US determination to escalate and direct threats to devastate the North, would force Hanoi to reconsider support for the war in the South. The first such direct threat had been conveyed to Hanoi in June via a Canadian diplomat, and the threat was repeated through the same channel a few days after the Tonkin bombings.

The campaign to coerce Hanoi was based on an image of the North Vietnamese as foreign aggressors in the South whose “ambitions” could be curbed by raising the cost high enough. A serious effort to understand Hanoi’s perspective on the war and on the issue of North-South relations, however, would have suggested the probability that a demonstration by the US of an intention to carry the war to the North would push Hanoi’s leaders into direct participation in combat in the South rather than forcing them to step back from the war. According to three Vietnamese officials I interviewed recently, a few days after the Tonkin Gulf reprisals the Vietnamese Communist leadership secretly convened a Central Committee plenum to consider the implications of the American move. Party leaders concluded that direct US military intervention in the South and the bombing of the North were probable, and that the party and government had to prepare for a major war in the South. In September the first combat units of the Vietnam People’s Army began to move down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The self-defeating errors of the Tonkin crisis were not unique to that administration of that conflict. The subjective expectation of aggressive action by an adversary can create imaginary threats and lead to unnecessary violence. Ignorance of an adversary’s viewpoint may cause a state to provoke unwittingly an action it would have wished to avoid. Until US decision makers are trained to think about managing conflict in a more disciplined way, the risk of blundering into confrontation will never be far off.

Fact or Fiction

Douglas Pike

The following is a Letter to the Editor that was published in response to this column. Douglas Pike was a military historian working at University of California, Berkeley.

Gareth Porter’s “Lessons of the Tonkin Gulf Incident: (Aug 9) concludes that the Gulf of Tonkin Incident “was a figment of the US government’s imagination.” He says “accumulated evidence” now makes this “reasonably certain.”

He is flatly contradicted by Hanoi historians who not only assert there was indeed a naval confrontation, but claim it ended in great victory for North Vietnam.

What Mr. Porter calls “the alleged North Vietnamese PT boat attack” is described in the PAVN Publishing House (Hanoi work “Military Events” as “three torpedo boats from Navy Squadron. Three attacked the destroyer Maddox...and chased it away.”

The Gulf of Tonkin incident was regarded as such a great victory that the PAVN navy uses Aug. 4, 1964 as its “anniversary date,” and celebrates it each year.

Secrets of the Vietnam War

By Philip B. Davidson

Philip B Davidson is a former CIA agent who served in Vietnam. He became a self-taught historian after the Vietnam War and self-published the book in which this excerpt appears.

Myth: The Tonkin Gulf Incident never happened, or if it did, the United States Intentionally provoked it

The Tonkin Gulf Incident refers to the attacks the North Vietnamese Patrol Torpedo (PT boats made on the US Destroyer Maddox on 2 August 1964 and to the alleged second attacks made on the US. Destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy on 4-5 August. The impact of this myth is that these unprovoked North Vietnamese attacks brought about the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed by the Congress on 7 August 1964. This resolution empowered President Johnson to commit United States forces in Vietnam. If the attacks did not occur, or if the United States forces provoked them, the incident, and thus, the basis for the resolution, was fraudulent. And since subsequent United States military operations were authorized by it, they, too were illegitimate.

There has never been any doubt that three North Vietnamese PT boats made an attack on the USS Maddox in international waters on 2 August 1964. In fact, the North Vietnamese boast about it in their official history of the Vietnam War.

The doubts arise about whether the United States had either unintentionally or deliberately provoked the North Vietnamese attacks. This requires some background detail. In early 1964, the United States and South Vietnam initiated a program known as Operation Plan (OPLAN) 34A, in which the South Vietnamese, with American advice and support, conducted a series of minor, largely ineffectual raids against North Vietnamese coast installations. The United States Navy alone conducted another operations program, called DESOTO, an operation to gain intelligence regarding North Vietnamese electronic devices and to acquire information of navigational and hydrographic conditions in the Tonkin Gulf.

On the night of 30-31 July, 120 to 130 miles away from the islands in international waters on its way to carry a DESOTO mission, which it initiated the following night (31 July – August), three North Vietnamese PT boats began high speed runs at the Maddox which at the time was 29 miles off the North Vietnamese coast. The attackers fired torpedo and 12.7 mm machine guns at the Maddox. The destroyer returned the fire, hitting one of the North Vietnamese boats. At 1730 hours (5:30 PM), four F-8E fighters from the USS Ticonderoga joined the fracas. They made several rocket and strafing runs, adding to the damage inflicted on the boats by the Maddox. By 1800 hours (6:00 PM) when the fighters had to leave the area, one North Vietnamese PT boat was dead in the water, and the other two, badly damaged, were running for the North Vietnamese coast.

Many opponents of the Vietnam War argue that the United States either intentionally or unintentionally (through negligence or lack of coordination) provoked the North

Vietnamese attacks on the Maddox of 2 August 1964. Those who argue to the affirmative point out that the North Vietnamese logically would confuse the raids of OPLAN 34A with the DESOTO mission of the Maddox.

They maintain that the instructions to the Maddox to approach no closer than eight nautical miles to the North Vietnamese coast and four miles to the off-shore islands, would result in violations of North Vietnam's definition of its coastal water, believed to be twelve nautical miles. Finally, they cite messages of 1 August from the captain of the Maddox, who stated that he realized that the mission was dangerous, but who did not retire from his provocative course or abort the mission.

Those who hold that the Maddox's actions were not provocative argue that the North Vietnamese should not have attacked the ship until they were sure that the Maddox had in fact bombarded the islands on 31 July. Adm. US Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) at the time, has gone further. He maintains that the North Vietnamese had tracked the Maddox by radar from the time it crossed the 17th Parallel (DMZ) and knew throughout its cruise where it was and what it was. In effect, Sharp claims that the North Vietnamese knew the Maddox had not engaged in the raids and yet attacked her anyway.

Sharp and others maintain that the orders given to the Maddox to stay eight miles from the North Vietnamese shore and four miles from the islands was in keeping with the declaration of the North Vietnamese that their coastal waters extended for five nautical miles, not twelve, and that the four-mile circumnavigation of islands complied with the internationally recognized three-mile territorial waters limit. Finally, those who think the Maddox was attacked without provocation, hold that the mission of the Maddox (to monitor electronic emissions from the North Vietnamese shore installations) was nothing new and had been carried out by both surface craft and aircraft all over the world. Further, the USS Craig had patrolled along the North Vietnamese coast on a similar mission some months earlier without incident. President Johnson, with some grumbling and vague threats, initially decided to accept the incident as a mistake on the part of the North Vietnamese. Of course, this was largely a domestic political decision. In 1964 he was running for president as the "peace candidate," contrasting his martial restraint to the bellicose blasts of his Republican Opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater. The president, however, in an effort to balance himself between action and inaction, ordered the DESOTO patrols to continue, reinforcing the Maddox with another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy.

On 4 August, the Maddox and the Turner Joy apprehensively returned to their patrol route. The cruise continued without incident until around 1915 hours, when the National Security Agency (NSA), after intercepting a North Vietnamese message, flashed the task force commander, Capt. John Herrick, a warning of a possible enemy PT boat attack. At 2035 hours the ship's radars picked up indications of the approach of three high-speed craft some thirty miles from the American vessels, and the crews of both ships went to General Quarters. At about 2130 hours, a confused fracas began. The night was dark, with an overcast sky and almost zero visibility. Radar men reported enemy contacts at various ranges, and the sonar men reported hearing the approach of some twenty enemy torpedo toward the American ships. The skipper of the Turner Joy

observed a column of black smoke arising from the water, but when he tried to get a closer look, the smoke had vanished. The pilots of the aircraft called from the Ticonderoga saw no enemy boats or any wakes of such craft.

To this day, no one (other than the North Vietnamese) is sure that on 4-5 August 1964 North Vietnamese craft attacked the two American ships. Intercepts of pertinent North Vietnamese radio communication (not all of which have been declassified) indicated almost certainly that the enemy decided to begin a hostile action against the American ships. Although NSA informed Captain Herrick that an enemy attack was imminent, another analyst studying the same message or messages believes that the messages ordered enemy patrol boat to investigate the destroyer. This latter interpretation would be confirmed by the original (and probably valid radar sensing of approaching enemy vessels.

After the shooting started, the reports of smoke, torpedo noises, torpedo sightings, radar contacts, and sinkings can be put down to combat hysteria. These crews were not combat veterans, and in the fear and excitement of their first or second battle, particularly under conditions of almost zero visibility, their minds could easily have played strange tricks. Captain Herrick, who was a combat veteran, was the first to question the factuality of the North Vietnamese attacks. To this day, Captain Herrick's simple statement remains the most valid summation of the "second attack of 4-5 August 1964.

At noon on 4 August (Washington time is thirteen hours behind Vietnam time), President Johnson convened the National Security Council and decided to launch a retaliatory strike against the North Vietnamese support facilities' at Vinh, where the attacking 100 hours, 5 August (Vietnam time). The pilots reported that fuel oil tanks at Vinh were burning and exploding, with smoke rising to 14,000 feet, and that eight North Vietnamese PT boats had been destroyed and twenty-one damaged. Two United States Navy aircraft were lost.

In summary—the North Vietnamese attacked the Maddox in international waters on 2 August 1964. They may have attacked the Maddox and the Turner Joy on the night of 4-5 August. If they did not attack on 4-5 August, the bulk of evidence indicates that the Communists at least made a hostile approach toward the two United States Warships. The actions of the two American vessels were at no time provocative. They kept out of North Vietnam's territorial waters. In fact, before each North Vietnamese attack or hostile approach, the vessels altered course so as to turn away from the Vietnamese coast. The United States vessels did not fire on their attackers until fired upon.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

This excerpt came from a college level textbook from a chapter called "LBJ and the Vietnam conflict" written in 1990.

In 1964 LBJ took bold steps to impress the North Vietnamese with American resolve and to block his vigorously anticommunist opponent, Barry Goldwater, from capitalizing on Vietnam in the presidential campaign. In February Johnson ordered the Pentagon to prepare for air strikes against North Vietnam. In May his advisors had drafted a congressional resolution authorizing an escalation of American military action and in July LBJ appointed General Maxwell Taylor, an advocate of a greater American role in Vietnam, as ambassador to Saigon. In early August, North Vietnamese patrol boats reportedly clashed with two US destroyers patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin. Despite virtually no evidence of an attack, Johnson announced that Americans had been victims of "open aggression on the high seas." Withholding the information that the U.S. destroyers had been aiding the South Vietnamese in clandestine raids against North Vietnam, the president condemned the alleged North Vietnamese attacks as unprovoked.

Card 1: Attacks

Johnson called on Congress to pass a resolution giving him the authority to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Assured that this power would lead to no "extension of the present conflict," the Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 88-2, and the House 416-0. Johnson called the resolution "grandma's nightshirt - it covered everything." The president, moreover, considered the resolution a mandate to commit U.S. Forces to Vietnam as he saw fit. But the resolution would soon create a credibility problem for Johnson, allowing opponents of the war to charge that he had misled Congress and lied to the American people. By providing LBJ with a blank check, the resolution also made massive U.S. Military intervention likely.

Card 2: The Resolution

AS I SAW IT, Autobiography of Dean Rusk, 1990

On August 2 and 4, 1964, we received reports that the USS *Maddox* and USS *C. Turner Joy*, American destroyers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam, had been attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in two separate incidents. Neither destroyer was hit. There is no doubt that the first attack took place, but we more or less brushed that aside as possibly the action of a trigger-happy local commander. Some doubt existed about whether a second attack ever occurred, but when we heard reports of a second attack, that raised the possibility that Hanoi might have decided to challenge the American presence in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Card 1: The attacks

I wasn't on the decks of those American destroyers that evening, but at the time, on the basis of the information available to us, we in Washington thought the second attack had occurred. The captains of those destroyers thought their ships had been attacked, and most convincing to me, our intercepts of North Vietnamese radio transmissions suggested that the North Vietnamese thought a second attack was in progress. The Republic of Vietnam today celebrates August 2-the day of the Tonkin Gulf attacks-as part of its national war effort against the Americans, so whatever happened that night in the Tonkin Gulf, evidently it takes credit for it now.

Lyndon Johnson was not looking for a pretext to launch retaliatory raids or escalate the war. Had he wanted a pretext, we could have used the first attack. Our two destroyers were on intelligence-gathering missions in international waters, and the American Navy had a right to operate in those waters. North Vietnam was using coastal waters to infiltrate men and arms into South Vietnam; from our point of view, this conduct was contrary to international law. South Vietnam under the doctrine of self-defense was trying to block this infiltration and mount retaliatory raids of its own-a secret operation called 34-A, supported by the American Navy.

Card 2: 34-A

But the destroyers attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin were on intelligence-gathering missions, not participating in South Vietnamese actions along the coast. It is entirely possible that the North Vietnamese thought that our destroyers were involved in these 34-A raids and in blockading operations along North Vietnam's coast to stop their infiltration of the South by sea. But even if Hanoi thought this, it isn't valid to call the exercise of self-defense a provocation.

After the second attack President Johnson called together about thirty congressional leaders, briefed them on what had happened, and told them about the retaliatory air strikes he intended to order. He then reminded them of President Truman's experience with Senator Robert Taft at the outbreak of the Korean War. Despite congressional assurances that Truman should respond to the North Korean invasion without seeking Congress's authorization. Taft had attacked Truman publicly.

Card 3: Self-Defense or Provocation

As I Saw It

2

Lyndon Johnson's memories of that experience were the real genesis of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Shortly after becoming president, Johnson told us, "If we stay in South Vietnam much longer or have to take firmer action, we've got to go to Congress." Various drafts of what eventually became the resolution circulated around the State Department long before the actual attacks occurred. But when the time came, we put aside those drafts, worked with the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and put together a streamlined version.

Having told congressional leaders about the Taft episode, Johnson asked if this was an appropriate time for a congressional resolution on American policy toward South Vietnam. The leadership, with near unanimity, urged him to go ahead but keep it short; it would be passed promptly and with a strong vote. Indeed, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, in which Congress declared its support for the United States' willingness to come to the assistance of those protected by the SEATO Treaty, including the use of armed force "as the President shall determine," was passed rapidly: 88-2 by the Senate and 416-0 by the House.

Card 4: The Tonkin Gulf Resolution

The resolution was simply worded, and there was no question about its meaning during the floor discussion. One senator asked Foreign Relations Committee Chairman William Fulbright if this resolution would permit dispatching large numbers of American forces to South Vietnam. Fulbright said he hoped it wouldn't be necessary to take such steps, but if this proved necessary, the resolution would allow it. Fulbright's views were those of Lyndon Johnson's; both men hoped there would be no escalation of the war. At the close of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's testimony, Fulbright told me privately that this was the best resolution of its sort he had ever seen presented to the Senate. I never forgot Fulbright's remark. He was all for it at the time. He urged the Senate to give it immediate and unanimous approval.

Senator Wayne Morse opposed the resolution as an unwarranted delegation of the war powers of Congress, warning of its far-reaching implications. But he was nearly alone. When some members of Congress later changed their minds about the war, they tried to throw a cloud on the resolution itself and the way we had presented it. But I have no doubt that they knew exactly what they were voting for. It was simply stated, and the floor discussion brought out all relevant aspects. Some later complained, "We didn't anticipate sending a half million men to South Vietnam," but neither did Lyndon Johnson.

Card 5: The Vote in Congress

I never worried about the constitutionality of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution or about subsequent actions based upon its authority. If Congress can declare war, surely it can take measures short of declaring war that fall within its constitutional powers. I felt the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was not congressional evasion of its war powers responsibility, but an exercise of that responsibility.

Card 6: Defense of the Resolution

Dean Rusk was Secretary of State at the time of the incident. He wrote his autobiography when he held an endowed chair later in life at the University of Georgia.

You Tube: Lyndon Johnson – Report on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dx8-ffiYyzA>

The Fog of War: Gulf of Tonkin: McNamara admits it didn't happen

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EROOxBEZ3mk>

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara phone call to LBJ:

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/04%20Track%204.wma>

Senator Wayne Morse says no to Vietnam 1964

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DyFq9yco_Kc

Activity

2 After Reading the Documents

After coming to a consensus with your partner about your answers to the three questions, given the evidence, talk to another pair. Share your decisions and resolve any disagreements. Record any new decisions here. For each question, select a different spokesperson to present the top two pieces of evidence that supports the group's position. Then discuss your answers with the class.

Activity

3 Preparing to Write a Historical Argument

Read the following from John Prados, Aug 4, 2004, retrieved from: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm>. John Prados is a National Security Archive Fellow at George Washington University and this is from his website on the Gulf of Tonkin.



A fresh addition to the declassified record is the intelligence estimate included in this briefing book, *Special National Intelligence Estimate 50-2-64*. Published in May 1964, the estimate again demonstrates that the United States purposefully directed OPLAN 34-A to pressure North Vietnam, to the extent of attempting to anticipate Hanoi's reaction. It wrongly concluded that North Vietnam, while taking precautionary measures, "might reduce the level of the insurrections for the moment." (Note 1) In fact Hanoi decided instead to commit its regular army forces to the fighting in South Vietnam.

And,

American pilots from the carrier *USS Ticonderoga* sent to help defend the destroyers from their supposed attackers told the same story. Commander James B. Stockdale, who led this flight of jets, spotted no enemy, and at one point saw the *Turner Joy* pointing her guns at the *Maddox*. As Stockdale, who retired an admiral after a distinguished career that included being shot down and imprisoned by the North Vietnamese, later wrote: "There was absolutely no gunfire except our own, no PT boat wakes, not a candle light let alone a burning ship. None could have been there and not have been seen on such a black night."

How did this author use evidence in his argument? What can you learn from this example?

Begin by planning your essay. On the next page, write the claim and outline, make a jot list or construct a concept map.



Activity

4 Writing the Argument

Write your essay.

When you are finished, evaluate your essay using the rubric on page 84. Share your essay with a partner to evaluate using the rubric. Identify 2 suggestions that you will use to revise your essay from the peer review and revise your essay. Submit the final version to your teacher.

A large, empty rectangular box with a thin green border, occupying the majority of the page. It is intended for students to write their arguments or notes.

Scoring Elements	1 Not Yet	1.5	2 Approaches Expectations	2.5	3 Meets Expectations	3.5	4 Advanced
Focus	Attempts to address prompt, but lacks focus or is off-task.		Addresses prompt appropriately and establishes a position, but focus is uneven.		Addresses prompt appropriately and maintains a clear, steady focus. Provides a generally convincing position.		Addresses all aspects of prompt appropriately with a consistently strong focus and convincing position.
Controlling Idea	Attempts to establish a claim, but lacks a clear purpose.		Establishes a claim.		Establishes a credible claim.		Establishes and maintains a substantive and credible claim or proposal.
Reading/ Research	Attempts to establish a claim, but lacks a clear purpose.		Presents information from reading materials relevant to the purpose of the prompt with minor lapses in accuracy or completeness.		Accurately presents details from reading materials relevant to the purpose of the prompt to develop argument or claim.		Accurately and effectively presents important details from reading materials to develop argument or claim.
Development	Attempts to provide details in response to the prompt, but lacks sufficient development or relevance to the purpose of the prompt.		Presents appropriate details to support and develop the focus, controlling idea, or claim, with minor lapses in the reasoning, examples, or explanations.		Presents appropriate and sufficient details to support and develop the focus, controlling idea, or claim.		Presents thorough and detailed information to effectively support and develop the focus, controlling idea, or claim.
Organization	Attempts to organize ideas, but lacks control of structure.		Demonstrates an uneven command of standard English conventions and cohesion. Uses language and tone with some inaccurate, inappropriate, or uneven features. Inconsistently cites sources.		Maintains an appropriate organizational structure to address specific requirements of the prompt. Structure reveals the reasoning and logic of the argument.		Maintains an organizational structure that intentionally and effectively enhances the presentation of information as required by the specific prompt. Structure enhances development of the reasoning and logic of the argument.
Conventions	Attempts to demonstrate standard English conventions, but lacks cohesion and control of grammar, usage, and mechanics. Sources are used without citation.		Demonstrates an uneven command of standard English conventions and cohesion. Uses language and tone with some inaccurate, inappropriate, or uneven features. Inconsistently cites sources.		Demonstrates a command of standard English conventions and cohesion, with few errors. Response includes language and tone appropriate to the audience, purpose, and specific requirements of the prompt. Cites sources using appropriate format with only minor errors.		Demonstrates and maintains a well-developed command of standard English conventions and cohesion, with few errors. Response includes language and tone consistently appropriate to the audience, purpose, and specific requirements of the prompt. Consistently cites sources using appropriate format.
Content Understanding	Attempts to include disciplinary content in argument, but understanding of content is weak; content is irrelevant, inappropriate, or inaccurate.		Briefly notes disciplinary content relevant to the prompt; shows basic or uneven understanding of content; minor errors in explanation.		Accurately presents disciplinary content relevant to the prompt with sufficient explanations that demonstrate understanding.		Integrates relevant and accurate disciplinary content with thorough explanations that demonstrate in-depth understanding.

Writer's Conference Form

Peer Reviewer's Name

Author's Name

Essay Topic

Date

Scoring Element	The Essay:	Comments:
Focus	Addresses all parts of the prompt	
Controlling Idea	Establishes a claim to prove	
Reading/	Includes evidence from Multiple texts	
Research	Provides supporting details for each point made	
Development	Maintains the structure that is required for the assignment	
Organization	Demonstrates a command of Standard Written English and the rules of citation for sources	
Conventions	Demonstrates an understanding of the content area in explanation and evidence	
Content Understanding		

Author: List two items below that you will revise to improve the quality of your essay:

- 1.
- 2.